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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples: input data that has
been manipulated to cause dramatic model output errors. To address this challenge,
we propose NeuralFingerprinting (NFP): a simple, yet effective method to detect
adversarial examples (in the grey-box and black-box threat models) for image
data. NFP relies on verifying whether prediction behavior is consistent with a
set of fingerprints. These fingerprints are encoded into the prediction response
around the data-distribution during training, and are inspired by biometric and
cryptographic signatures, and we provide a theoretical characterization of NFP for
linear networks. We also show that NFP significantly improves on state-of-the-art
adversarial detection mechanisms for deep neural networks, by detecting a full
range of known adversarial attacks with 98-100% AUC-ROC scores on the MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and MiniImagenet (20 classes) datasets. We analyze NFP in detail under
the grey/black-box threat models, when the adversary has limited or no-access to
the exact fingerprints. Further, in the white-box setting, we find that NFP is robust
against a full-array of the strongest-known attacks that have full knowledge of the
defense; we subsequently developed a new adaptive white-box attack to fool NFP.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are highly effective pattern-recognition models for a wide range of
tasks, e.g., computer vision [1], speech recognition [2] and sequential decision-making [3]. However,
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples: an attacker can add (small) perturbations to input
data that are imperceptible to humans, and can drastically change the model’s output, introducing
catastrophic errors [4, 5, 6]. When DNNs encounters adversarial data, one desirable response is to
flag the data and abstain from making confident predictions, thereby enabling DNNs to function
reliably in noisy environments or mission-critical applications, e.g., in autonomous vehicles.
In this work, we study the problem of detecting adversarial data (after which the DNN abstains from
making predictions). We propose NeuralFingerprinting (NFP): a fast and secure method to training
DNNs to robustly detect grey-box and black-box adversarial attacks [7]. The grey-box setting is
motivated by the practical security setting where a private key is used to secure the system from
adversaries [8]. For NFP, this specific key is the exact sequence of randomly generated fingerprints.
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The core idea of NFP is to encode fingerprint patterns into the response of a DNN around real data.
These patterns characterize the DNN’s expected behavior around real data and can be used to detect
adversarial examples. This approach is attractive as encoding fingerprints is simple to implement
during training, and evaluation is computationally inexpensive. Furthermore, NFP is agnostic of the
adversary’s attack mechanism. We provide a formal characterization of NFP for linear classification.
We conduct a thorough empirical evaluation of NFP across a range of adversarial attacks in computer
vision. We show that NFP achieves state-of-the-art near-perfect AUC-ROC scores on detecting and
separating unseen test data and adversarial examples in the grey- and black-box threat models. The
performance of NFP is demonstrated to be robust to the choice of fingerprints and hyperparameters.
Finally, we find that NFP is robust to a full-range previously known white-box adversarial attacks;
we subsequently developed a new adaptive white-box attack to break NFP (See Appendix F).
2 Related Work
Detection versus Robust Prediction There are two broad classes of approaches to safe-guarding
against adversarial data: robust prediction and detection. A major bottleneck with robust predictions
can be the inherently larger sample complexity associated with robust learning [9]. Further, in [10],
the authors argue that true robustness leads to depreciation in accuracy.
Robust Prediction of Adversarial Examples Several defenses based on robust learning have been
proposed [11, 12, 13]. While these defenses provide robustness in the threat models (l∞ bounded
attacks) under which training is performed, the robustness does not carry over to other threat-models
(bounded l0, l1 distortions [14], attacks with generative models [15]).
Several other defenses attempt to make robust predictions: by relying on randomization [16], intro-
ducing non-linearity that is not differentiable [17] and by relying on Generative Adversarial Networks
[18, 19] for denoising images. However, recent work has shown that several of these defenses
are not secure [20, 21, 22]. Several defenses proposed in the grey-box setting [23, 24] have been
rendered vulnerable by attacking proxy defenses [25], ensembles and attacking the expectation over
the distribution (for defenses relying on randomization) [20]. We study NFP extensively under these
attacks and find that NFP is robust to such adaptive grey-box attacks.
Robust Detection of Adversarial Examples Amongst defenses that study the detection of adver-
sarial examples, [26] detects adversarial samples using an auxiliary classifier trained to use an
expansion-based measure, local intrinsic dimensionality (LID). Similar detection methods based on
Kernel Density (KD), Bayesian-Uncertainty (BU) [27] and the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) [28]
using artifacts from trained networks have been considered. In contrast to such methods (including
[23]), NFP does not need auxiliary classifiers and performs significantly better than LID, KD and BU
when the attack mechanism is unknown.
Adversarial Attacks in Other Domains. We evaluate NFP on computer vision tasks, a domain in
which DNNs have proved to be effective and adversarial examples have been extensively studied.
NFP could potentially be employed to secure DNNs against attacks in domains such as speech
recognition [29] and text comprehension [30]. Adversarial attacks have also been studied in domains
such as detection of malware [31], spam [32] and intrusions [33]. Data-poisoning [34] is another
form of attack where maliciously crafted data is injected during training.
3 Neural Fingerprinting
We consider supervised classification, where we aim to learn a model f(x; θ) from real data{
(xi, y∗i)
}
i∈I , where x ∈ Rl is an input example (e.g., an image) and y∗ is a 1-hot label vec-
tor y∗ ∈ {0, 1}K over K classes. Here, we assume the data is sampled from a data distribution
Pdata(x, y). For example, a neural network f predicts class probabilities P (y|x; θ) as:
f(x; θ)j = P (yj |x; θ) =
exph(x; θ)j∑
l exph(x; θ)l
, (1)
where h(x; θ) ∈ RK are called logits and the most likely class is chosen. The optimal θ∗ can be
learned by minimizing a loss function L(x, y; θ), e.g., cross-entropy loss.
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Figure 1: Example of detecting adversarial examples using NFP with N = 2 fingerprints, for K-class
classification. ϕ(x) is the model output. NFP separates real data x (top) from adversarial data
x′ = x+ η (bottom) by comparing the sensitivity of the model to predefined perturbations around
unseen inputs with a reference sensitivity encoded around the manifold of real images during training.
The training for NFP forces the maximum softmax scores on in-distribution samples to be high, and
a threshold on the maximum softmax score distinguishes between real examples from adversarial.
Adversarial Attacks In an adversarial setting, an attacker attempts to construct adversarial exam-
ples x′, such that yˆ = argmaxl P (yl|x′; θ) is an incorrect class prediction (i.e., Pdata(x′, yˆ) = 0).
In this work, we focus on bounded adversarial attacks, which produce small perturbations η that
cause mis-classification. This is a standard threat model, for an extensive review see [35]. More
generally, a bounded adversarial example causes a large change in model output, i.e. for δ, ρ > 0,
‖η‖ ≤ δ, we have ‖f(x + η) − f(x)‖ > ρ such that the class predicted by the model changes:
argmaxj f(x+η)j 6= argmaxj f(x)j . An example bounded attack is the Fast-Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [6] which uses an input-space gradient: η ∝ sign ∂L(x,y;θ)∂x . Since the perturbation η is small,
a perturbed image x′ can be indistinguishable from x but still cause very different predictions.
Encoding Fingerprints into Network Response To defend DNNs against adversarial data, we
propose training networks with NFP. Training with NFP entails encoding fingerprints around the
data-distribution into the network response, and the network response can then be leveraged to detect
whether an input example x is real or adversarial. A defender using NFP begins by choosing input
perturbation(s) ∆x around x, and desired changes in the model response ∆y. Formally, we define a
fingerprint χ as the tuple χ , (∆x,∆y). For K-class classification, we define a set of N fingerprints:
χi,j = (∆xi,∆yi,j), i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where χi,j is the ith fingerprint for class j. To characterize sensitivity, we define the function
F (x,∆xi) to measure the change in model output. A simple choice could be F (x,∆xi) = f(x+
∆xi)− f(x) (although we will use variations hereafter). Once a defender has constructed a set of
desired fingerprints χ, the chosen fingerprints can be embedded into the network’s response by adding
a fingerprint regression loss during training. Given a classification model, the fingerprint loss is:
Lfp(x, y, χ; θ) =
N∑
i=1
‖F (x,∆xi)−∆yi,k‖22, (3)
where k is the ground truth class for example x and ∆yi,k are the fingerprint outputs. Note that we
only train on the fingerprints for the ground truth class. The total training objective then is:
min
θ
∑
(x,y)
(L0(x, y; θ) + αLfp(x, y, χ; θ)) , (4)
whereL0 is a loss function (e.g. cross-entropy loss for classification) and α a positive scalar. Hereafter,
we will use α = 1 for brevity, but in practice, we choose α to balance the task and fingerprint losses.
As noted before, the ∆xi (∆yi,j) are chosen by the defender. Note that we use the same directions
∆xi for each class j = 1, 2 . . . ,K, and that ∆yi,j can be either discrete or continuous depending on
f(x; θ). Here, the goal of a defender is to minimize D(x, f, χi,j) for real data x.
3
Detecting Adversarial Examples We exploit the characterization described above to detect adver-
sarial examples by comparing F (x,∆xi) with the reference output-perturbation ∆yi:
D(x, f, χ·,j) , 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖F (x,∆xi)−∆yi,j‖2. (comparison function) (5)
Algorithm 1 NeuralFP
1: inputs: example x, model f , com-
parison func. D (Eq. 5), threshold
τ > 0, fingerprints {χi,j} (Eq. 2)
2: if ∃j : D(x, f, χ·,j) ≤ τ then
3: return: accept #real
4: end if
5: return: reject #fake
The objective from (4) trains the model so that the function
D has low values around the real data, e.g., the train-
set. The approach for detecting adversarial examples is
summarized in Algorithm 1 and Figure 1. The key idea
is to detect adversarial examples by using a consistency
check of the model output around the input. NFP classifies
a new input x′ as real if the change in model output is close
to the ∆yi,j for some class j, for all i. Here, we useD and
threshold τ > 0 to define the level of agreement required,
i.e., we declare x′ real when D is below a threshold τ :
x′ is real⇔ ∃j : D(x′, f, χ·,j) ≤ τ. (6)
Hence, the NFP test is defined by: NFPdata =
({
χi,j
}
i=1...N,j=1...K
, D, τ
)
.
Computational Complexity Extra computation comes from checking the condition in (6) which
requires O(NK) forward passes to compute F (x,∆xi). A straightforward implementation is to
check (6) iteratively, and stop whenever an agreement is seen or all classes have been exhausted. One
can also parallelize the computation and use minibatches for real-time applications.
3.1 Choosing and Characterizing Fingerprints: Linear Models
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Figure 2: Geometry of fingerprints
for SVMs with linearly separable
data. Let d(x) be the signed dis-
tance to the decision boundary (see
Thm 1), and δmax± (δ
min
± ) denote the
maximal (minimal) distances of the
positive (x+) and negative (x−) ex-
amples to the hyperplane 〈w, x〉 +
b = 0. The fingerprint ∆x1 with
〈∆x1, wˆ〉 = δmin− will have f(x− +
∆x) < 0 and f(x−) < 0 for all
x− in the data distribution (red re-
gion). Hence, ∆x1 will flag all x′
in the regions −δmin− < d(x′) < 0
as not real, since for those x′ it
will always see a change in pre-
dicted class. Similarly, ∆x2 with
〈∆x2, wˆ〉 = δmax− always sees a
class change for real x−, flagging
all x′ : d(x′) < −δmax− as not real.
We first analyze NFP on binary classification with data{(
xi, y∗i
)}
i∈I and linear model (SVM):
f(x) = 〈w, x〉+ b, yˆ = sign f(x) ∈ {−1, 1} ,
on inputs xi ∈ Rn, where n 1 (e.g., n = 900 for MNIST).
The SVM defines a hyperplane f(x) = 0 to separate positive
(yˆ = +1) from negative examples (yˆ = −1). We will assume
that the positive and negative examples are linearly separable
by a hyperplane defined by a normal wˆ = w‖w‖ . We define
the minimal and maximal distance from the examples to the
hyperplane along wˆ as:
δmin± = min
i:yi=±1
∣∣〈xi, wˆ〉∣∣ , δmax± = max
i:yi=±1
∣∣〈xi, wˆ〉∣∣ .
In this setting, the set of xi classified as real by fingerprints is
determined by the geometry of f(x). Here, for detection, we
measure the exact change in predicted class using:
F (x,∆x) = ∆y = sign (〈w, x+ ∆x〉+ b)
− sign (〈w, x〉+ b) ∈ {−2, 0, 2} .
Theorem 1 (Fingerprints for SVM). Consider an SVM with
wˆ = w‖w‖ and separable data, and the following:
(∆x1 = δmin− wˆ,∆y
1,− = 0), (7)
(∆x2 = δmax− wˆ,∆y
2,− = +2), (8)
(∆x3 = −δmax+ wˆ,∆y3,+ = −2), (9)
(∆x4 = −δmin+ wˆ,∆y4,+ = 0). (10)
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Figure 3: Left to right: 1) decision boundary without fingerprints. 2) with fingerprints, red arrows
indicate fingerprint-directions. The decision boundary is more non-linear. 3) contour plot of finger-
print loss. NFP detects dark regions as “real”, while lighter ones are “fake” (tunable through τ ).
Fingerprinting creates valleys of low-loss delineating real data. 4) We see a similar phenomenon for
the CIFAR-10 dataset. Fingerprint losses on 100 random test (blue) and adversarial (red) images
(Table 3). We see a clear separation, illustrating that NFP is effective across many thresholds τ .
An adversarial input x′ = x± + η is one for which one of the
following holds:
d(x′) > δmax+ , 0 < d(x
′) < δmin+ , d(x
′) < −δmax− , −δmin− < d(x′) < 0. (11)
Here, d(x′) = 〈x
′,w〉+b
‖w‖ is the signed distance to the separating hyperplane.
The proof for two fingerprints is shown in Figure 2. The full proof is in the Appendix. Theorem 1
by itself does not detect adversarial inputs that involve distortions parallel to the decision boundary.
An adversary could push a negative example x− across the boundary to a region outside the data
distribution (Pdata(x− + η, y) = 0), but within distances δmin+ and δ
max
+ of the boundary. This
would still be judged as real by using fingerprints. However, such examples could still be detected by
also checking the distance of x− + η to the nearest x+ in the dataset.
3.2 Choosing and Characterizing Fingerprints: DNNs
In contrast to the linear setting, in general NFP utilizes a softer notion of fingerprint matching
by checking whether the model outputs match changes in normalized-logits. Specifically, for
classification models f(x; θ) with logits h(x; θ) (see Eqn 1), where F is defined as:
F (x,∆xi) , ϕ(x+ ∆xi)− ϕ(x), ϕ(x) , h(x; θ)/‖h(x; θ)‖,
where ϕ are the normalized logits. The logits are normalized so the DNN does not fit the ∆y by
making the weights arbitrarily large. Here, we use D(x,∆xi) as in (5). Note that here ∆yi,j ∈ RK .
Choosing ∆y For our experiments, we choose the ∆y so that the normalized-logit of the true class
either increases or decreases along the ∆xi (analogous to the linear case). For e.g., for a 10-class
classification task, if x is in class k we choose ∆y of the form: ∆ykl 6=k = α and ∆y
k
l=k = −β, for
k = 1, . . . , 10, and α, β ∈ R+. We found that reasonable choices are α = 0.25 and β = 0.75, and
that the method is not sensitive to these choices. For investigation in the grey-box setting (with an
adaptive attacker), we randomize the ∆yk in addition to the ∆x. This randomization minimizes the
assumptions the attacker can make about the fingerprints and is detailed in Appendix C.
Choosing∆x For nonlinear models (e.g., DNNs), the best fingerprint-direction ∆x choice is not clear.
We use a straightforward extension from the linear case with randomly sampled ∆x’s. Randomization
minimizes structural assumptions that may make NFP exploitable. For all experiments, we sampled
∆xi uniformly from [−ε, ε]: ∆xi ∼ U(−ε, ε)l, where l is the input dimension. Our experiments (see
Figure 7) suggest that NFP is not sensitive to the random values sampled. This also suggests that the
∆xi could be chosen based on different approaches.
Visualizing Fingerprints. To understand the behavior for non-linear models, we trained a DNN
(two hidden layers with 200 ReLU nodes each) to distinguish between two Gaussian balls in 2D spac.
Figure 3 describes this experiment. Without fingerprints, the model learns an almost linear boundary
separating the two balls (compare with Figure 2). When we train to encode the fingerprints, we
observe that NFP causes the model to learn a non-linear pockets of low fingerprint-loss characterizing
the data-distribution. In this simple setting, NFP learns to delineate the data-distribution, where the
darker regions are accepted as real and the rest is rejected.
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Dataset
Source Natural Advers. NFP Natural Advers. NFP
(FGSM) (FGSM) (FGSM) (BIM-b) (BIM-b) (BIM-b)
MNIST 99.96 99.91 99.32 99.62 99.77 99.83
CIFAR-10 99.92 99.89 99.43 99.71 99.41 99.35
Table 2: NFP detection AUC-ROC against black-box attackers (know dataset but not model or
fingerprints), on MNIST, CIFAR-10 tasks on test-set (“real”) and corresponding black-box adversarial
(“fake”) samples (1328 pre-test samples each). NFP achieves near perfect AUC-ROC. For CIFAR-10,
the hyperparameters are (N, ε) == (30, 0.003) . For MNIST, (N, ε) = (10, 0.03).
3.3 Threat Model Analysis for Adversarial Attacks
In the adversarial setting, the various threat-models describe varying amounts of information available
to the attacker. We study NFP under multiple such threat models (Table 1), where the attacker has
varying levels of knowledge of NFPdata and model f(x; θ).
In the black-box attack setting the attacker has no knowledge of the network weights NFPdata. We
study NFP in this setting, and discuss query and transfer based attacks.
θ NFPdata
× × black-box attack
X × grey-box attack
X X white-box attack
Table 1: Threat-models: attacker knows
θ and/or NFPdata.
In the grey-box setting, the attacker has access to θ,
can query f(x; θ) and its derivatives, but does not know
NFPdata. We assume the adversary has access to the dis-
tribution from which the fingerprints are sampled but not
the exact sequence of the fingerprints. This is a frequently
used threat-model in cryptography and in practice, where
a key or a password is used to secure a system. This set-
ting is the most commonly studied, and is the focus of
most defenses reported in Section 2 (e.g., [26, 18, 28]).
The grey-box setting is relevant, for instance, when the attacker has a copy of the classifier, but
the fingerprints are private, in accordance with Kerchhoff’s principle [36] (e.g. when NFP is run
on a cloud). We study grey-box attacks in detail because of its practical relevance, and show that
safe-keeping of the fingerprints ensures robustness against adversarial attacks.
We note that reverse engineering the NFPdata by brute-force search can be combinatorially hard. To
see this, consider a simple setting where only the ∆yi.j are unknown, and that the attacker knows
that each fingerprint is discrete, i.e. each component ∆yi.jk = ±1. Then the attacker would have to
search over combinatorially (O(2NK)) many ∆y to find the subset of ∆y that satisfies the detection
criterion in (6). Further, smaller τs reduce the volume of inputs accepted as real. In our investigation
in the grey-box setting, we randomize both the set of ∆xs and the ∆ys, thereby minimizing the
structural assumptions the adversary can make with regard to the fingerprints.
The strongest threat model assumes the attacker has full information about the defender, for e.g.,
when the attacker can either reverse-engineer or has access to the fingerprint data NFPdata, so that
stronger attacks could be possible. In this setting, NFP is robust to the full range of attacks in
literature. However, we find that a new attack that adaptively solves the multi-objective optimization
problem of minimizing the fingerprint-loss while producing a misclassification is able to fool NFP at
large computational costs. We discuss the evaluation in detail under this setting in Appendix F.
Additionally, we define the notion of white-box defense (defender is aware of the attack mechanism)
and black-box defense (defender has no knowledge about attacker) – NFP is a black-box defense.
There has been considerable progress in black-box attack and white-box defense settings (e.g. [37]).
However, progress in grey-box attack, black-box defense threat-models is relatively limited.
4 Experiments
We empirically validate NFP on a number of vision data-sets, We analyze the behavior and robustness
of NFP against adversarial attacks under various threat models. We also study the sensitivity of NFP
to varying hyperparameters. The study of the white-box-attack setting is deferred to Appendix F. We
empirically find that:
• NFP is robust under the black-box and grey-box adversarial threat-models.
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Data Method FGSM JSMA BIM-a BIM-b CW-L2
MNIST LID 99.68 96.36 99.05 99.72 98.66KD 81.84 66.69 99.39 99.84 96.94
BU 27.21 12.27 6.55 23.30 19.09
KD+BU 82.93 47.33 95.98 99.82 85.68
NFP 100.0 99.97 99.94 99.98 99.74
CIFAR-10 LID 82.38 89.93 82.51 91.61 93.32KD 62.76 84.54 69.08 89.66 90.77
BU 71.73 84.95 82.23 3.26 89.89
KD+BU 71.40 84.49 82.07 1.1 89.30
NFP 99.96 99.91 99.91 99.95 98.87
Table 3: Detection AUC-ROC of black-box defenders (do not know attack strategy) against partial-
white-box-attackers (know model f(x; θ), but not defense details; see Section 3.3), on MNIST,
CIFAR-10 on test-set (“real”) and corresponding adversarial (“fake”) samples (1328 pre-test samples
each). NFP outperforms baselines (LID, KD, BU) on MNIST & CIFAR-10.
• Using NFP does not diminish prediction accuracy (when not abstaining).
Adversarial Attacks We perform evaluation against adversarial attacks under various threat-
models on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and MiniImagenet-20 datasets. We use the following state-of-the-art
attacks (Table 12):
• Fast Gradient Method (FGSM) [6] and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [38] are both gradient
based attacks with BIM being an iterative variant of FGSM. We consider both BIM-a
(iterates until misclassification has been achieved) and BIM-b (iterates 50 times).
• Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [39] perturbs pixels using a saliency map.
• Carlini-Wagner Attack (CW-L2): an attack that optimizes to minimize the perturbation
needed for misclassification, and is one of the strongest known attacks [40, 22].
On CIFAR-10 and MiniImagenet-20, all attacks have a successful misclassification rate of 99−100%
and on MNIST, FGSM has a successful misclassification rate of 89%, while the other attacks have
near-perfect misclassification rates. See Table 12 for attack success rates and distortion bounds.
4.1 Black-box adversarial Examples
We consider black-box adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Even though the black-box
setting is the weakest threat model, practical black-box attacks have been shown to be feasible in
several real-world applications [41, 42].
MNIST. We train a 5-layer ConvNet to 99.2 ± 0.1% test-accuracy. The set of ∆xi ∈ R28×28 is
chosen randomly, with each value chosen uniformly in [−ε, ε]. For each ∆xi, if x is of label-class k,
∆yi,k ∈ R10 is chosen to be such that ∆yi,kl 6=k = 0.25 and ∆yi,kl=k = −0.75, with ‖∆y‖2 = 1.
CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-10, we trained a 7-layer ConvNet (similar to [40]) to 85± 1% accuracy. The
∆xi and ∆yi,j are chosen similarly as for MNIST.
First, we consider transfer based attacks [41] from models trained i) naturally, ii) adversarially using
robust learning, and iii) with NFP. The results are summarized in Table 2, and we see that NFP is able
to detect transfer based attacks with near-perfect accuracy. Next, we consider query based attacks
such as [43, 44]. A key first step for these attacks is the ability to sample adversarial points that can
fool the detector. To evaluate the feasibility of such attacks on NFP, we sample large numbers of
points randomly and check if they are adversarial. We see that from over 109 sampled points (with
relatively large perturbations), we do not encounter a single adversarial point with a small fingerprint
loss (See Appendix E for details).
We finally consider an attack where the adversary has access to the distribution from which the
fingerprints are sampled but not the exact fingerprints nor the model weights. Under this scenario,
the adversary can attack an ensemble of models trained with NFP by sampling fingerprints from the
distribution and exploit the transferability of adversarial examples to attack the original model. We
train an ensemble of three substitute models, and generate adversarial examples using the white-box-
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Data Unknown ∆x, Unknown ∆y Unknown ∆x, known ∆y
CIFAR-10 100.00 99.85
Table 4: Detection AUC-ROC of NFP vs grey-box EOT attacks (100 pre-test samples).
attack described in Appendix F. For this attack, 45.1% of the adversarial examples do not transfer,
and NFP achieves an AUC-ROC of 94.72% on the remaining samples.
4.2 Grey-box adversarial Examples
This threat-model is considerably stronger than the black-box setting. The adversary has access to the
model weights and the distribution from which the fingerprints are sampled. The baselines LID [26],
a recent detection based defense; KD; BU [27]; all trained on FGSM, as in [26] evaluate primarily in
this setting. Following [26], for each dataset we consider a randomly sampled pre-test-set of unseen
1328 test-set images, and discard misclassified pre-test images. For the test-set of remaining images,
we generate adversarial perturbations by applying each of the above mentioned attacks. We report
AUC-ROC on sets composed in equal parts of the test-set and test-set adversarial samples. The
AUC-ROC is computed by varying the threshold τ . See Appendix for model and dataset details.
The FGSM, BIM-a, BIM-b and JSMA attacks are untargeted. We use published code for the attacks
and code from [26] for the baselines. The AUC-ROCs for the best N and ε using grid-search are
reported in Table 3. We see that NFP achieves near-perfect detection with AUC-ROC of 99− 100%
across all attacks. On CIFAR-10, across attacks, NFP outperforms LID on average by 11.77% and
KD+BU, KD, BU even more substantially (Table 3). Even compared to LID-white-box (where
LID is aware of the attackers mechanism but NFP is not), NFP outperforms LID-white-box on
average by 8.0% (Appendix, Table 10). Further, we find that NFP is robust across a wide-range of
hyperparameter choices. (See Figures 5,7). Additionally, we evaluated NFP against Wasserstein
Adversarial Examples, introduced recently in [45]. NFP is able to distinguish between adversarial and
clean data with an 98%+ AUC-ROC (See Appendix for details). Wasserstein adversarial examples
include perturbations such as scaling, rotation, translation, and distortion.
Data FGSM BIM-b
MiniImagenet-20 99.96 99.68
Table 5: AUC-ROC of NFP vs grey-box
attacks on MiniImagenet-20, (N, ε) =
(20, 0.05).
MiniImagenet-20. We test on MiniImagenet-20 with 20
classes randomly chosen (from 100) [46] and trained an
AlexNet network on 10,600 images (not downsampled)
with 91.1% top-1 accuracy. We generated test-set adversar-
ial examples using BIM-b with 50 steps [47] and FGSM.
NFP achieves AUC-ROCs of > 99.5% (Table 5). We
could not get results for JSMA and CW-L2, which require too much computation for tasks of this
size. Results for other defenses are not reported due to unavailable implementations.
A more sophisticated grey-box attack is one where the adversary attempts to use the fingerprint
distribution from which the fingerprints are sampled from to mount an adaptive attack. We investigate
the robustness of NFP against such an attacker. For this setup, we randomize both the ∆ys and
the ∆xs (See Appendix C for details). Several defenses relying on randomness [24, 16] have been
rendered vulnerable using the expectation-over-transformation (EOT) attack introduced in [20].
Under this attack, we consider two scenarios: (i) the adversary has access to the exact ∆y but not
∆x, and (ii) the adversary does not have access to both the ∆x, ∆y. Note that scenario (i) is not
likely in practice, but we evaluate to consider how much information an attacker needs to render NFP
vulnerable. In scenario (ii), the adversary attempts to minimize the fingerprint-loss in expectation
while producing a misclassification on the original model by minimizing the following objective:
Ladv(x, y
∗, θ) + γE∆x∼T∆x,∆y∼T∆y [Lfp (x, y∗, χ; θ)] ,
where Ladv is the misclassification objective, T∆x and T∆y are the distributions from which ∆x and
∆y are sampled respectively. To mount the EOT attack, at each iteration, the adversary samples a new
set of fingerprints and attempts to minimize the fingerprint-loss while producing a misclassification.
For this, we use the attack that is successful in the white-box setting described in Appendix F for
50000 steps. Attacks for the other scenarios are constructed similarly. The results for these attacks
are summarized in Table 4, and we find that the defense is robust against the EOT attack.
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5 Conclusion
Our experiments suggest NFP is efficient at safeguarding DNNs from adversarial attacks. We find
that NFP is effective at detecting the full range of state-of-the-art adversarial attacks (grey/black-box),
and the high AUC-ROC scores indicate that the fingerprints generalize well to the test-set, but not to
adversarial examples. Furthermore, we find that NFP is robust to a full-range of white-box attacks
available in literature; we then develop a new attack to fool NFP, pushing white-box attacks further.
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Figure 4: Geometry of fingerprints for SVMs with linearly separable data. Let d(x) be the distance
of x to the decision boundary (see Thm 1). δmax± (δ
min
± ) denote the maximal (minimal) distances
of the positive (x+) and negative (x−) examples to the separating hyperplane 〈w, x〉+ b = 0. The
fingerprint ∆x1 with 〈∆x1, e〉 = δmin− will have f(x− + ∆x) < 0 and f(x−) < 0 for all x− in
the data distribution (red region). Hence, ∆x1 will flag all x′ in the regions −δmin− < d(x′) < 0
as “fake”, since for those x′ it will always see a change in predicted class. Similarly, ∆x2 with
〈∆x2, e〉 = δmax− always sees a class change for real x−, thus flagging all x′ with d(x′) < −δmax−
as “fake”.
Appendices
A Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. Also see Figure 4. Consider any perturbation η = λe that is positively aligned with w, and
has 〈η, e〉 = δmin− . Then for any negative example (x−,−1) (except for the support vectors that lie
exactly δmin− from the hyperplane), adding the perturbation η does not change the class prediction:
sign f(x−) = −1, sign f(x− − η) = −1. (12)
The fingerprint in (7) is an example of such an η. However, if λ is large enough, that is:
〈η, e〉 = δmax− , (13)
(e.g. the fingerprint in (8)), for all negative examples (x−,−1) the class prediction will always
change (except for the x− that lie exactly δmax− from the hyperplane):
sign f(x−) = −1, sign f(x− + η) = +1, (14)
Note that if η has a component smaller (or larger) than δmin± , it will exclude fewer (more) examples,
e.g. those that lie closer to (farther from) the hyperplane. Similar observations hold for fingerprints
(9) and (10) and the positive examples x+. Hence, it follows that for any x that lies too close to the
hyperplane (closer than δmin± ), or too far (farther than δ
max
± ), the model output after adding the four
fingerprints will never perfectly correspond to their behavior on examples x from the data distribution.
For instance, for any x that is closer than δmin+ to the hyperplane, (10) will always cause a change in
class, while none was expected. Similar observations hold for the other regions in (11). Since the
SVM is translation invariant parallel to the hyperplane, the fingerprints can only distinguish examples
based on their distance perpendicular to the hyperplane. Hence, this choice of λs is optimal.
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Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 11× 11× 64
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 192
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 384
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 256
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 156
MaxPool 3× 3
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 3072
Dropout -
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 1024
Dropout -
Softmax 20
Table 6: MiniImagenet-20 Model Used
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 32
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 200
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 200
Softmax 10
Table 7: MNIST Model Used
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 32
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 128
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 128
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 256
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 256
Softmax 10
Table 8: CIFAR Model Used
B Models for Evaluation
Note: Code for CW-adaptive is based on code from https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_
attacks. We use published code from [45] for Wasserstein Adversarial Attack, and the other attacks
were obtained from the paper [26].
B.1 MNIST
For MNIST, we use the model described in Table 7.
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B.2 CIFAR-10
For CIFAR-10, we use the model described in Table 8
B.3 MiniImagenet-20
MiniAlexNet Model We use a model similar to AlexNet for MiniImagenet-20. The model used is
described in Table 6
MiniImagenet-20 classes We use images from the following 20 ImageNet classes for our
experiments:
n01558993, n02795169, n03062245, n03272010, n03980874, n04515003 n02110063,
n02950826, n03146219, n03400231, n04146614, n04612504, n02443484, n02981792,
n03207743, n03476684, n04443257, n07697537
C Grey-box Evaluation – ∆y Hyperparameters
Instead of simple ∆yi,j , we can encode more complex fingerprints that are harder to guess for
an adversary. For the grey-box threat-model evaluation in Section 4.2, for each ∆xi, we sample
∆yi,j ∈ R10 such that each entry of ∆yi,j is uniformly drawn from [−0.5, 0.5]. This random
sampling minimizes the structural assumptions the adversary can make about the fingerprints.
D Sensitivity analysis
We study the effect of changing N (number of fingerprint directions) and ε (magnitude of fingerprint-
perturbation ∆x) on the AUC-ROC for CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Figure 6 and 5 show that NFP
performs well across a wide range of hyperparameters and is robust to variation in the hyperparameters
for PWAs. With increasing ε, the AUC-ROC for CW-L2 decreases. As discussed before, a possible
explanation is that CW-L2 produces smaller adversarial perturbations than other attacks, and for larger
fingerprint-distortions ε, the fingerprints are less sensitive to those small adversarial perturbations.
However, the degradation in performance is not substantial (∼ 4 − 8%) as we increase ε over an
order of magnitude. With increasing N , the AUC-ROC generally increases across attacks. We
conjecture that larger sets of fingerprints can detect perturbations in more directions and results in
better detection.
Figure 7 shows that NFP achieves mean AUC-ROC of 98%− 100% against all PWA, with standard
deviation < 1%. This suggests that NFP is not very sensitive to the chosen fingerprints.
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Figure 5: AUC-ROC performance for different hyperparameter settings (top-left: Varying ε (N = 10),
top-right:Varying N (ε = 0.03)) and ROC curves (bottom) on MNIST. We see that the performance
of NFP is robust across attacks and hyperparameters, with the AUC-ROC between 90− 100% for
most settings. The AUC-ROC is lowest versus CW-L2, which is one of the strongest known attack.
E Randomized Queries – sanity check for query based attacks
To evaluate the feasibility of query based black-box attacks such as [43, 44], we sample randomly
in -balls around unseen test-data to find adversarial examples. For 100 MNIST test samples, we
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Figure 6: AUC-ROC for different hyperparameters (top-left:Varying fingerprint magnitude ε (N =
10), top-right: Varying no. fingerprints (N ) (ε = 0.01)) and ROC curves (bottom) on CIFAR-10
for partial-whitebox attacks. For analysis on MNIST, see Appendix. NFP is robust across attacks
& hyperparameters with an AUC-ROC between 95− 100%. Increasing N improves performance,
indicating more fingerprints are harder to fool. Increasing the magnitude ε decreases AUC on CW-L2
only, suggesting that as adversarial perturbations become of smaller magnitude, NFP requires smaller
ε.
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Figure 7: AUC-ROC mean µ and standard-deviation σ for 32 randomly sampled fingerprints (includ-
ing randomizing N ) for CIFAR-10. The AUC-ROC across all PWAs varies little (σ < 1%), with σ
highest for CW-L2.
sample 106 points uniformly from the l∞-ball with ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.3 and for 50 CIFAR-10 test samples,
we sample 5× 105 points uniformly from the l∞-ball with ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.25. Amongst these randomly
sampled points for each test point, we compute the smallest min
i
(Lfp (x, i, ξ; θ)) (let us call this
value L∗fp) across points that are adversarial (i.e. cause a misclassification). Note that L
∗
fp for each
test point is the minimum fingerprint-loss over all adversarial samples sampled around the point
and across all labels. For CIFAR-10, we are able to find adversarial examples for 47 points and for
MNIST, we are able to find adversarial examples for 52 points. Figure 8 shows the distribution of
Lfp across the test points and L∗fp across the corresponding randomly sampled adversarial points.
We observe that for MNIST, one single test sample has a high fingerprint-loss while all adversarial
samples have high fingerprint-losses. The remaining test-samples have fingerprint-losses that are
roughly 3− 30 times smaller than the adversarial examples. For CIFAR-10, the test and adversarial
points are well separated, with most test samples having losses significantly smaller (roughly 10
times smaller) than the randomly sampled adversarial examples. This indicates that it is extremely
difficult to perform query based black-box adversarial attacks against NFP. This also indicates that
NFP removes most of the adversarial examples, and does not simply gradient mask.
F Whitebox Analysis of NFP
The strongest threat-model, whitebox-attack, is one where the adversary has access to the parameters
of NFP. To evaluate whether NFP is robust in this setting, ), we consider adaptive variants of FGSM,
BIM-b, CW-L2, and SPSA [21]. Under this threat-model the attacker tries to find an adversarial
example x′ that also minimizes the fingerprint-loss (3), while attacking the model trained with NFP.
We find that NFP is robust across the full range of such state-of-the-art attacks, achieving AUC-ROCs
of 96-100% (See Table 9)
Adaptive-FGSM, Adaptive-BIM-b, Adaptive-SPSA For the FGSM, BIM-b and SPSA (untar-
geted) attacks we mount an adaptive attack with a modified optimization objective as in [21]. Specifi-
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Figure 8: Top: MNIST, Bottom: CIFAR-10. Histograms depicting the distribution of losses for
randomly sampled adversarial examples and test-data. Randomly sampled adversarial examples are
well separated from unseen test examples. For NFP, hyperparameters are (ε,N) = (0.1, 10) and
(ε,N) = (0.003, 30) for MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively.
Data Method Adaptive-FGSM Adaptive-BIM-b Adaptive-CW-L2 Adaptive-CW-L2 (γ2 = 1) Adaptive-SPSA
MNIST NFP 99.91 99.37 95.04 99.17 99.94
CIFAR-10 NFP 99.99 99.92 97.19 97.56 99.99
Table 9: Detection AUC-ROC for adaptive whitebox attacks on datasets MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Other defenses such as [18, 37], including the baselines KD and BU, fail under adaptive-attacks
(< 10% accuracy). For MNIST, the NFP parameters for FGSM, SPSA are (ε,N) = (0.1, 10)
and (ε,N) = (0.05, 20) for the BIM-b, CW-L2 attacks. For CIFAR-10, the parameters are set at
(ε,N) = (0.003, 30) across attacks.
cally, for SPSA, the loss function to minimize is:
Jadvθ (x
′, y∗, θ) + γLfp (x′, y∗, χ; θ) ,
where Jadvθ is the original adversarial objective from [21]. For the gradient-based FGSM and BIM-B
attacks, we use gradients of the following loss function:
LCE(x, y
∗, θ)− γLfp (x, y∗, χ; θ) ,
where LCE(x, y∗) is the cross-entropy loss. For each of the attacks and for each data-point, we
choose the largest γ ∈ [10−3, 104] that results in a successful attack with a bisection search over γ –
note that larger γ values increase the priority for minimizing Lfp. For the three adaptive attacks, the
perturbation bounds are ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.4 for MNIST and ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.05 for CIFAR-10.
Adaptive-CW-L2 We consider two adaptive variants of the CW-L2 attack. The first variant we
consider is with the modified objective function:
min
x′
‖x− x′‖2 + γ1 (LCW (x′) + γ2Lfp (x′, y∗, χ; θ)). (15)
Here, y∗ is the label-vector, γ1 ∈ [10−3, 106] and γ2 ∈ [10−3, 104] are scalar coefficients, Lfp is
the fingerprint-loss we trained on and LCW is an objective encouraging misclassification. To find γ1
and γ2 we do a bisection search, first decreasing γ1 (as in [22]) and then increasing γ2 gradually in
a similar manner. Note that increasing γ2 increases the importance given to minimizing Lfp. The
successful attack with the smallest Lfp during our search is chosen.
The second variant is similar to the one considered in [22]. Here γ2 is held at 1.0 and the successful
attack with the smallest ‖x− x′‖2 is chosen during a bisection search over γ1.
F.1 New White-Box Attack for Breaking NFP
While NFP is robust to the full range of attacks studied above, we find that this is because of the highly
nonconvex problem the attacker is required to solve. During detailed analysis we notice that during
the multi-objective optimization of minimizing the fingerprint loss(Lfp) and the misclassification
loss(Ladv), the individual losses oscillate, which makes it difficult to craft adversarial examples with
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Data Method FGM JSMA BIM-a BIM-b CW-L2
MNIST LID 99.68 98.67 99.61 99.90 99.55NFP 100.0 99.97 99.94 99.98 99.74
CIFAR-10 LID 82.38 95.87 82.30 99.78 98.94NFP 99.96 99.91 99.91 99.95 98.87
Table 10: Detection AUC-ROC for NFP,whitebox-LID against whitebox-attackers (know model
f(x; θ), but not fingerprints; see Section 3.3), on MNIST, CIFAR-10 tasks on test-set (“real”) and
corresponding adversarial (“fake”) samples (1328 pre-test samples each). NFP outperforms the
baselines (LID, KD, BU) on MNIST and CIFAR-10 across all attacks, except CW-L2 where it
performs comparably. A possibly explanation for LID’s improved performance against stronger,
iterative attacks is gradient masking [20].
Method Parameters
CW-L− 2 Bisection-steps (γ1)=9, Bisection-steps (γ2)=5, Max Iteration Steps = 1000,
L2_ABORT_EARLY = True, L2_LEARNING_RATE = 1e-2, L2_TARGETED = True,
L2_CONFIDENCE = 0, L2_INITIAL_CONST = 1e-3 (γ1 initial value)
L2_INITIAL_CONST_2 = 0.1 (γ2 initial value)
SPSA Bisection steps=6, Upper-bound for bisection = 50.0,
spsa-iters=1, spsa-samples=128, Lower-bound=0.001
Iterations = 100, lr=0.01,dr=0.01
BIM (MNIST) eps-iter=0.010
BIM (CIFAR) eps-iter=0.005
Wasserstein (CIFAR) Regularization=3000, Wasserstein-distance(p)=2, PGD Step Size(alpha)=0.1,
epsilon=0.01, epsilon_factor=1.17, maxiters=400
Table 11: Attack hyperparameters corresponding to Tables 3,9, and 13.
low fingerprint loss. To solve this problem, we consider a new attack that can adaptively solve this
optimization problem stabilizing the two losses and generating adversarial examples that successfully
fool NFP.
Unlike current adaptive attacks which use a fixed coefficient (γ) when attacking detection models
with multiple loss(e.g.: Lfp and Ladv in NFP), we scale both losses to balance the gradients from
the two losses and simultaneously optimize both of them. To do this, we introduce two functions
that vary monotonically as a function of the difference between the fingerprint-loss of the adversarial
sample (x′) and the real sample (x). Define ∆Lfp(x, x′) = Lfp(x′, y′, χ; θ)− Lfp(x, y, χ; θ), where
y′ = f(x′). Define two functions:
f1(x
′, x) := 10∆Lfp(x,x
′),
and
f2(x
′, x) := 0.1∆Lfp(x,x
′),
We then perform an optimization based attack (with SGD) to minimize:
f1(x
′, x)Lfp(x′, y′, χ; θ) + Ladvf2(x′, x).
We find that this cost function effectively optimizes both losses simultaneously, both producing
a misclassification and minimizing the fingerprint-loss, thereby fooling the detector. Using this
attack (50000 steps with learning-rate=0.00001) with a distortion bound of ‖η∞‖ ≤ 0.031, we are
able to reduce the AUC-ROC to about 0.5. This implies that the adversarial examples are virtually
indistinguishable from real samples. We use this successful whitebox-attack to evaluate EOT and
transfer based attacks in the grey-box/black-box setting.
G Attack Hyperparameters
Tables 11, 12 summarize the hyperparameter settings corresponding to the experiments in Tables 3,9,
and 13.
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Data Attack Test Bound on Adversarial
Accuracy Perturbation η
MNIST FGSM 11.87% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.4BIM-a 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.4
BIM-b 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.4
JSMA 1.73%
CW-L2 0.00%
CIFAR FGSM 11.39 % ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.05BIM-a 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.05
BIM-b 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 0.05
JSMA 13.33%
CW-L2 0.00%
Wasserstein 9.08%
MiniImagenet FGSM 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 16/255BIM-b 0.00% ‖η‖∞ ≤ 16/255
Table 12: Parameters and model test-accuracy on PW-attacks for different datasets (without NFP
test). CW-L2, Wasserstein and JSMA attacks are unbounded. The bounds are relative to images with
pixel intensities in [0, 1].
Data Attack AUC-ROC
CIFAR-10 Wasserstein 98.14
Table 13: Detection AUC-ROC for NFP against greybox Wasserstein adversarial attack on CIFAR-10
task.
H Wasserstein Adversarial Example
NFP is able to distingish between Wasserstein Adversarial Example and clean-data efficiently (Table
13). We increase the default epsilon value from 0.001 to 0.01 to achieve more than 90% attack success
rate. The remaining hyperparameters are the same as in [45].
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